In the month of June 1861 the North and South begin to mobilize. The railroad junctions of Harpers Ferry and Manassas become critical points of interest for both sides.
General Lee Organizes Virginia’s Defenses
Since his appointment by the Virginia Legislature, to the command of Virginia’s State Militia, General Lee had built up an army of 40,000 soldiers, all of them except for the general officers, untrained and many unarmed. Outfitting as many of these men as possible under the circumstances, he traveled about the State, establishing garrisons at the points on the frontier, which the enemy would likely seek to penetrate.
In his undertaking of this somber business, General Lee was well aware of Virginia’s likely failure to protect herself. In his thirty of military service, he had traveled all over the land and knew the details of the relative power of the contending countries. Anyone could count up the disparities between them – of such elements as farm animals, land in cultivation, human population, factories, metals, finance – and see Virginia’s dismal future; but nailing the outcome in his mind was the match-up between the States across the breadth of the land.
In both his public and private attitudes this sober understanding of reality reveals itself: As one of the Confederate Government’s advance men said at the time, General Lee did not project enthusiasm for the was; on the contrary, the man reported, Lee wished “to repress enthusiasm.” Another report came to Jefferson Davis about this time: “Lee is too despondent. His remarks are calculated to dispirit our people. I fear he does not think our cause is righteous.” Returning from inspecting the ground at Manassas, at the end of May, Lee was reported to say to a crowd at the railroad depot: “I have no time for speeches, the road ahead will be a long and hard trial. You all should disperse and get about your work, the young men to your drilling, the women to your homes, the older men to your business.”
On June 1, Jefferson Davis, having arrived from Richmond with an entourage to establish there a Confederate Government, met with Lee. By this time, Joseph Johnston, late Quartermaster General of the United States Army, had reported for duty and had been sent to Harper’s Ferry, to take command of the forces defending the Valley. Pierre Beauregard, the “hero of Sumter,” arrived from Charleston and was assigned command at Manassas Junction. Davis listened to Lee’s report of what he and done to defend Virginia against invasion and accepted his recommendations regarding measures necessary to bolster the State’s defenses.
In Lee’s meeting with Davis on June 1, the two men agreed together on the paramount military policy of the government. The upper Shenandoah Valley had to be held at all costs – it supplied the meat, grain, and vegetables the Army would need to sustain itself in the field, and it provided the corridor through which war materials could reach Virginia from Georgia. Of equal importance, they agreed, was the necessity of maintaining as long as possible a strong presence at Manassas Junction, blocking the enemy from the roads to Richmond, Leesburg and the valley.
After the meeting, Lee wrote to Joe Johnston, who had complained to Davis that his position at Harper’s Ferry was untenable.
Lee wrote:
“I am aware of the obstacles to the maintenance of your position at Harper’s Ferry with your present force. It is hoped that sufficient reinforcements can be sent to you to enable you to carry out the plan of defense. Should you be opposed by a force too large to resist, destroy everything, deprive them of the use of the railroad, take the field and contest their approach, step by step into the interior. I am sending you what troops, wagons and ammunition that I can.”
“A large force is now collecting in front of Alexandria and General Beauregard has been sent to command it. Its’ presence will make the enemy cautious in approaching your rear south of the Potomac.”
McClellan Moves Across the Ohio into the Virginia Mountains
On June 20, a thirty-four year old George McClellan left Cincinnati and proceeded to join his forces occupying Phillipi in West Virginia. He wrote of his traveling experience to his wife, Mary Ellen: “A continual ovation all along the road. At every station where we stopped, crowds had assembled to see me, mothers holding up their children to take my hand. I could hear them say, ‘Look at him, how young he is:’ ‘He will thrash them!”’
Patterson Steps In and Out of the Valley
On June 8, General Scott wired Patterson, who was gathering an army of 18,000 Pennsylvanians at Hagerstown, Maryland: “I order Burnside to you with the 1st Rhode Island regiment and battery. We must sustain no reverse; even a check or drawn battle would be a victory to the enemy. Attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success.”
When Burnside arrived several days later, Patterson moved to Williamsport and began crossing his corps over the Potomac into Virginia; as he did this, Joe Johnston abandoned possession of Harper’s Ferry. According to Patterson, his corps was half across the Potomac, moving south in pursuit of Johnston, when a telegram came from General Scott: “I propose no pursuit. Send to me, at once, all the regular troops, cavalry and infantry with you, and the Rhode Island Regiment.” Patterson’s first reaction to this was to wire Scott asking that the regulars be permitted to remain and that the corps be allowed to transfer its base of operations from Hagerstown to Harper’s Ferry, for the purpose of gradually advancing on Winchester.
On June 16, Patterson received Scott’s response: “The enemy is concentrating upon Arlington and Alexandria, and this is the line to be looked to. (Lee was building up Davis’s hold on Manassas.) The regulars with you are needed here; send them and the Rhode Island Regiment as fast as possible.”
General Scott Loses Lincoln’s Attention
General Scott was engaged in a losing struggle to get Lincoln committed to his plan. Lincoln was insisting that the army, commanded by McDowell, be used to clear Manassas Junction of the enemy. Lincoln had his reasons for this – the most substantial one being the fact that Congress would soon be in session, considering the issue of ratifying his actions. He wanted Washington to be clear of the camps idle, rancorous soldiers, and he wanted the war quickly taken beyond the point of no return.
To Scott’s mind, the fundamental reason against ordering a movement against Manassas was that the men were physically and mentally incapable of performing the evolutions such an attack would require: this primarily because the regimental officers were uneducated, untrained volunteers. The military objective is to get possession of Manassas Junction which deprives the enemy of their communications with their base at Culpeper and necessarily forces them to retreat at least as far as the Rappahannock River. To achieve this objective by means of a frontal attack against an enemy entrenched behind the ditch of Bull’s Run, with a mob of untrained men, was too ridiculous for Scott to even contemplate.
Next month…the Battle of First Manassas
The previous material is taken from the writings of Joe Ryan. For a more in-depth look into the time line of the Civil War read Mr. Ryan’s work at americancivilwar.com
| < Prev | Next > |
|---|
